The New Economy’s New Key Indicators: Lobbying, DC Luxury Hotel Occupancy Up

An article in today’s Wall Street Journal, “Federal Intervention Pits ‘Gets’ vs. ‘Get-Nots'” provides two new key indicators of just what drives the new, new economy: government largesse.

Government spending as a share of the economy has climbed to levels not seen since World War II. The geyser of money has turned Washington into an essential destination for more and more businesses. Spending on lobbying is up, as are luxury hotel bookings in the capital.

The article goes on to say that 2008 spending on lobbying was up 80% (to $3.3 billion) from the previous high of 2002, when businesses geared up to fight the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley.

While the article doesn’t specify by how much luxury hotel bookings are up in Washington, here in San Francisco, previously among the top destinations for private travelers, luxury hotel rates have fallen nearly 20%.

Mommas, Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up to Report on the Government’s Financial Reforms

If you do, they will almost certainly disgrace your family by writing reports that can be interpreted in only two ways: (1) the reporter is a shill for the government, passing off government propaganda as news and analysis; and (2) the reporter is dreadfully incompetent and naïve with regard to government policies. Sad to say, many reporters display both sorts of failings simultaneously.

I am provoked to make these observations not merely by having been exposed to the mainstream news media for the past fifty years or so, but also, just this morning, by having blundered across an Associated Press article headlined “Obama Seeks to Overhaul Financial Rules.”

Of course, the headline can’t be accurate. Barack Obama knows nothing about finance, so he would not have the foggiest idea where to start in overhauling the existing financial rules. But let’s be generous. The story attributes to the emperor himself a project that is actually being carried out by his scheming lackeys in the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve System, and other parts of his vast bureaucracy. These faithful (and some, no doubt, not-so-faithful) servants are of course acting in the emperor’s name, whether or not he understands the details of their machinations.

“The goal,” the article informs us, “is to prevent a recurrence of the economic crisis that erupted in the United States and exploded last fall with devastating consequences still reverberating around the world.” This claim cannot be right. My best guess is that the actual goal is to give the impression of taking actions that will prevent a recurrence of these recent troubles, the better to shift the blame away from the actual perpetrators—various government officials and their harmful policies—and thereby in effect to place the blame on various financial actors and institutions in the private sector (if indeed there remains much of a truly private financial sector in the wake of all the recent government takeovers).

The article goes on to say that “in devising new regulations and oversight, the administration is looking to address four perceived weaknesses in the current system.” Let us briefly consider them.

First alleged weakness:

The need for an all-seeing government entity to detect institutional stresses that threaten the entire financial system. Think of the mortgage-backed securities that are still weighing down bank balance sheets.

Should we laugh or cry? “An all-seeing government entity to detect institutional stresses”? Unless this expression is meant as a joke, the reporter here reveals either terrible incompetence or shameful complicity in spreading government propaganda. The idea that a government agency, or a hundred government agencies all rolled into one gigantic can of red-tape worms, can be “all seeing” in its purview of the country’s financial transactions is ludicrous. We have miles and miles of financial laws and regulations on the books now. Most of them have been in force for decades. We have thousands of lawyers, accountants, economists, and other charlatans working for dozens of government agencies at every level who are, and long have been, charged with ensuring that nobody engages in financial hanky-panky. Did anyone in this kingdom of jobbery foresee the financial debacle that reached crisis proportions late last summer? Did not all of these supposed watchdogs, instead, devote themselves to proclaiming ceaselessly for years on end that everything was hunky-dory and that they had matters well in hand. Are we supposed to believe that these people will now, inexplicably, develop an acute case of competence?

Second alleged weakness:

The inability to step in and unwind large and complex institutions before they fail and become the thread that unravels the fabric of the system.

Ah, yes, we must empower the government to mount preemptive attacks against the greatly dreaded dragon of systemic risk. In this case, however, St. George seeks the power to slay a dragon that exists more in the hyperbole of government press agents than in reality. We have been told repeatedly that the financial system contains a number of large boulders, any one of which might set off a world-crushing avalanche if it were allowed to begin rolling down the hillside freely. But scientific evidence of such potentially destructive big rocks is as rare as hen’s teeth. The tale makes a splendid accompaniment, however, to a raid on the Treasury by a big bank or other mega-institution that, seeing its chance, seeks to snatch trainloads of money while the snatching is good.

Even if systemic risk does exist, why should anyone believe that the fakers and time-servers employed by a government regulatory agency will have the ability to gauge its magnitude and to identify the specific firms that must be eased away from the precipice—always, of course, at the great expense of taxpayers and holders of dollar-denominated assets?

Let’s be frank: systemic risk is the greatest—and perhaps the phoniest—excuse for unwarranted bailouts ever devised by the mind of man. After all, who wouldn’t prefer to cough up hundreds of billions of dollars to ill-managed banks, rather than enduring the collapse of the world economy?

Third alleged weakness,

The undercapitalization of large financial institutions. Heading into the financial crisis, too many banks were leveraged with significantly more debt than equity.

And why, pray tell, did the bank managers think that they did not need more equity? Might  the answer have something to do with the various explicit and implicit ways in which the government has placed itself in readiness to bail out a big bank whose ultra-risky bets turn sour? Might government deposit insurance explain why depositors continued to hand their money over to banks run by high-stakes gamblers? If people had known that their own funds were always at risk and that they, and they alone, would have to bear fully any losses that arose, they would not have behaved as they did between 2002 and 2007. Government actions and promises to take the risk out of risky behavior produced exactly what any thinking person would have expected: massive moral hazard. Now, the government’s huge bailouts are validating all the expectations that the banking gamblers and others entertained during the boom, thereby setting the stage for the next destructive, government-induced boom in malinvestments. Moreover, the same government officials who were fundamentally instrumental in making possible the malinvestments of the past decade (and in some cases their chosen successors in office) have the gall to pretend that they are now fixing the system, even as they actually do nothing but reinflate the same ill-fated bubble.

Fourth alleged weakness,

Consumers and lenders whose unwitting or reckless credit and borrowing decisions placed families under staggering debts and contributed to the instability of the financial system. Obama [sic] is likely to recommend creation [of] a financial services consumer protection body with oversight powers over mortgages and credit cards and other consumer financial products.

I tell you, these guys could do stand-up; they’re hilarious. They have the outrageous chutzpah to imagine that they—the most financially irresponsible parties in the history of the world, the very people who control a government whose unfunded obligations run in excess of several times the country’s gross domestic product, the same people who whipped and goaded Fannie, Freddie, and the banks to dish out these dodgy mortgage loans in the first place—will henceforth oversee how private lenders and borrowers conduct their transactions, to insure that everyone acts with becoming prudence and responsibility. Ha ha ha ha—I’m rolling with laughter, I tell you. Does anybody take such drivel seriously? Really, anybody?

Well, okay, maybe the reporters for the mainstream media do. At least, they continue to file their reports with straight faces. But behind the scenes, Barney Frank, Chris Dodd, Chuck Schumer, and the rest of the congressional carnival barkers have to know better. They also have to know, however, that even though they played key roles in shoving first the financial system and then the whole economy over the brink, they have emerged from the mess that they made smelling like roses. They still have their power; the campaign contributions from the fat cats keep pouring into their coffers; and they continue to drive the Obama administration’s make-believe financial-reform bills through the congressional maze toward their ultimate enactment as the next round of bad financial law—the selfsame sort of bad law under which this country has suffered ever since Ben Cohen, James Landis, and Tom Corcoran fired up this destructive locomotive during the early New Deal.

Don’t expect the financial reporters to make any sense of all this, however. The evidence seems overwhelming that they are either clueless or co-opted by the government—and quite possibly they are both.

The Bay of Pigs (Howard Jones)

My friend and colleague, Howard Jones, discusses his first-rate book, The Bay of Pigs in a first-rate interview with Scott Horton.

He was in good company that day. Other guests on the show were the “other” Scott Horton from Harper’s Magazine and Juan Cole. Those of you who have not listened to Horton’s radio show at antiwar.com are missing out.

Principles and Politics: Like Oil and Water

My title is taken from my review of Timothy Besley’s book, Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government, which appeared in the June 2009 issue of The Review of Austrian Economics. The reasoning behind my title is that the institutional structure of democratic politics puts elected representatives who act on their principles at a disadvantage.  Unprincipled politicians come out ahead because of the design of the system.

To accomplish anything in a legislature requires the support of a majority of legislators.  Nobody can do anything by themselves.  The mechanism by which legislators can further their agendas is to trade votes with each other.  “I’ll vote for your bill if you’ll vote for mine.”  Legislators accumulate power when they agree to vote for someone else’s bill; they use up accumulated power when they call in their IOUs to secure the support of colleagues for their bills.  The legislators who accumulate the most power in this setting are those who are ALWAYS ready to trade.

If a legislator always votes on principle, that legislator will have no chance to enter the political exchange process, and no chance to “buy” the support of other legislators by trading votes.  If a certain measure goes against the principled legislator’s principles, the legislator will always vote against, so there’s no point in bargaining to try to change the principled politician’s vote.  If a certain measure aligns with the principled legislator’s principles, the legislator will always vote for, and there is no need to buy that legislator’s vote.

An unprincipled politician can always be bought.  If a measure comes up that the unprincipled legislator is inclined to oppose, supporters can offer that legislator a trade to get the legislator’s support.  The legislator trades his/her vote, and gains a future claim on the vote of a colleague.  That’s how power is accumulated in the legislature.

If a measure comes up that the unprincipled legislator is inclined to support, other supporters still must bribe the unprincipled legislator to keep his/her vote.  Supporters know that even though the legislator is inclined to support the legislation, if the opponents make a good enough offer the unprincipled legislator will vote with the opponents.  Unprincipled legislators have to be bribed even to vote the way they would be inclined to vote anyway, and in the process they accumulate even more political power in the form of claims against the future votes of their colleagues.

The system is set up to reward unprincipled politicians and punish principled ones, and the process of natural selection works here just as in many other settings.  The principled politicians get weeded out as unprincipled politicians gain influence.  Principles and politics don’t mix.

Challenge of Liberty Seminar Now Open to Single-Day Attendance

Attention High-school Students and College Undergrads:

If you wish to attend the Challenge of Liberty Student Seminars but your schedule prevents you from attending for the entire week, then fret no more! The Independent Institute is opening up the June session of its popular seminar to single-day attendance. Pay for only those days that you can attend. Please let us know which day(s) you wish to attend. (Space is still available for the August 10-14 session, but early registration is advised.)

The preliminary schedule for the June session is below.

The Challenge of Liberty Student Seminar, led by Brian Gothberg
The Independent Institute
100 Sway Way
Oakland, Calif.
(510) 632-1366
events@independent.org

Session I: June 15 – 19, 2009
9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.

Tuition: $39/day. $195/week. Includes materials & meals.
(Scholarships available. Phone us.)

Seminar page

Map and Directions

Preliminary Schedule for June 15-19

Monday: Economics and Liberty

1. Introduction to Economics: What are we talking about when we discuss economics? What IS the economy?

2. Guest Speaker: Dr. James Ahiakpor (CSU East Bay) on the National Economy
A beginner’s guide to the facets of the economy, and to government policies

3. Guest Speaker: Dr. José Yulo (Academy of Arts Univ.) on Liberty
What exactly do we mean by “liberty”?

4. Self-Determination: Putting economics and liberty together. Are they compatible?

Tuesday: Market Chaos or Hidden Order?

1. Prices: What are prices, and why are they indispensable? How do prices shape our world?

2. Markets: What is a market? What activities do markets elicit? What kinds of patterns arise from markets?

3. Jobs: What is a job? WHY are there jobs? Should jobs go overseas? Are jobs going away?

4. Government interventions: What alternatives do we have to prices and markets? When are they feasible? What are the advantages? What are the disadvantages?

Wednesday: Monopoly or Competition?

1. Competition: What IS competition? How does it work? When do we want it? Who competes? Is it a “dog eat dog” world?

2. The Birth of Monopolies: What makes a monopoly possible? Where do monopolies come from?

3. Guest speaker: Dr. Fred Foldvary (Santa Clara Univ.) on Monopolies and Technology
The complications that arise when the government creates monopolies

4. The End of Monopolies: What makes a monopoly impossible? What stops monopolies?


Thursday: Market Failure or Government Failure?

1. Public Goods: What is market failure? Which goods and services MUST be provided by the government?

2. Property Rights: What are property rights? Why do they matter in a discussion of “spillover effects”? Why do they matter when discussing the environment?

3. Guest speaker: Anthony Gregory (The Independent Institute) on National Defense
The ultimate public good: national defense. How do we grade the government’s performance?

4. Energy Policy and Climate: What approach should we take towards climate change? What steps has the government made in the past, to manage America’s energy resources and consumption?

Friday: Inflation, Recession and Government

1. Our current recession: An overview of the last two years

2. Guest speaker: Carl Close (The Independent Institute) on Inflation
What is inflation? What causes it? What problems does it cause?

3. Guest speaker: Dr. Fred Foldvary (Santa Clara Univ.) on the Austrian Theory of the Business Cycle
What are business cycles? Where do they come from? Can we fix them when they happen? Can we avoid them beforehand?

4. The Great Depression: What was the Great Depression? What caused it? What ended it? What lessons does it teach us?

Harper’s on Black Maverick

Scott Horton of Harper’s Magazine (not the “other Scott Horton” at antiwar.com) just did a story on my book (co-authored by Linda Royster Beito) Black Maverick: T.R.M. Howard’s Fight for Civil Rights and Economic Power:

T.R.M. Howard was not everyone’s idea of a civil rights hero, and his accomplishments have been widely neglected. But as historians David Beito and Linda Royster Beito demonstrate in their book Black Maverick: T.R.M. Howard’s Fight for Civil Rights and Economic Power, he was in fact one of the most effective black civil rights leaders of his generation and a key figure in bringing civil rights to Mississippi and empowering black voters in Chicago. I put six questions to David Beito about his new book.

1. Howard’s life puts him at the center of a number of historic events, usually playing a vital role, particularly in the civil rights movement of the fifties and sixties, yet his name rarely figures in the short list of leadership figures cited in the media. Has his role been underappreciated?

Hard Liquor, Murray Rothbard, and You: Partners in Freedom

The Murray Rothbard “Enemy of the State” flask. Some have suggested that the next logical step is a cigarette case featuring a prominent Austrian economist (did Mises smoke? I know Hayek did). I would like to see this conclude with a complete and official “Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms” set. Perhaps the Mises Institute could team up with the Ayn Rand Institute to produce customized dollar-sign cigarettes?

Disclosure: since I write for the Mises Institute (here’s today’s contribution) and will be on the faculty at Mises University at the end of next month, skeptical readers might want to take my enthusiasm for their products with a grain of salt–a grain that, perhaps, could someday be dispensed from a Frederic Bastiat or J.B. Say salt shaker.

Cross-posted at Division of Labour.

National Review on Black Maverick

The word is slowly getting out about my book (co-authored by Linda Beito), Black Maverick: T.R.M. Howard’s Fight for Civil Rights and Economic Power. John J. Miller has interviewed us for the National Review:

‘While historians have properly acknowledged the contributions of clergymen and grassroots activists” to the civil-rights movement, write David T. Beito and Linda Royster Beito, “they have too often neglected those made by entrepreneurs and black professionals.” The Beitos’ new book—Black Maverick: T. R. M. Howard’s Fight for Civil Rights and Economic Power—begins to set the record straight.

For the rest, see here.

Tax “Reform”, Terminator-Style

In searching for ways of resolving California’s $21 billion budget “crisis”, some months ago Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger appointed a commission (“blue-ribbon” is obligatory here) to study ways of revamping the state’s tax code. According to him, the current system, which relies heavily on income tax receipts to fund governmental operations, produces a revenue stream that is unreliable because it fluctuates too wildly with the ups and downs of California’s economy.

Duh! Taxes from all sources rise and fall with the level of economic activity and the truth of the matter is that income tax receipts are much less volatile than, say, sales tax receipts.

Be that as it may, and fearing that the tax-study commission’s recommendations may be too timid, Governor Schwarzenegger told the editorial board of the Sacramento Bee recently that he hopes that the commissioners will be bold enough to propose “something like” a flat tax rate of 15 percent on all personal incomes.

There is much to be said in favor of a single income tax bracket—think of all the tax lawyers and CPAs society could do without if tax returns were reduced to the size of a postcard: tell me how much you earned last year, multiply that number by 15% and send it in.

California’s personal income tax tables now contain a mind-numbing seven brackets, starting out at 1 percent on the first $7,168 of taxable income and rising to 9.3 percent on incomes over $47,055. When one adds in a 1 percent surcharge on incomes of $1 million or more (the so-called Mental Health Services Tax that Californians apparently would have been crazy to object to), the top marginal tax rate is 10.3 percent.

The governor’s call for a flat tax of 15 percent on personal incomes thus amounts to hiking the top marginal rate by 50 percent—and applying it to all Californians, rich and poor alike. (Presumably a taxable income threshold would be set below which no tax would be owed, but a flat tax usually implies that no deductions are allowed for things like charitable contributions and mortgage interest payments, meaning that the average Californian’s taxable income would be much higher than it is under the tax code now in force.) Such a “reform” hardly is a sensible path to fiscal responsibility in a state that has been hit hard by the bursting of the housing bubble and is bleeding jobs as companies locate to more market-friendly environments. Rather than sharpening the state’s tax teeth, it would be far better to cut public spending to a level the taxpayers can afford.

I suspect that Governor Schwarzenegger glanced at Californian’s total taxable personal income last year and figured that a tax rate of 15 percent would generate enough additional revenue to claim credit for closing the state’s budget gap. As the Laffer curve teaches, however, higher tax rates can yield less revenue as taxpayers avoid reporting all of their taxable income or simply choose not to work as hard as before.

A flat tax on personal income is a great idea, but not if it raises the average tax rate. Set it at 6 percent or 7 percent and watch California flourish.

Military-Contracting Waste, Fraud, and Abuse—Just What the Government Wants

According to a June 7, 2009, Associated Press report,

In its first report to Congress, the Wartime Contracting Commission presents a bleak assessment of how tens of billions of dollars have been spent since 2001. The 111-page report, obtained by The Associated Press, documents poor management, weak oversight, and a failure to learn from past mistakes as recurring themes in wartime contracting.

. . .

The commission cites concerns with [inter alia] a massive support contract known as “LOGCAP” that provides troops with essential services, including housing, meals, mail delivery and laundry.  . . . KBR Inc., the primary LOGCAP contractor in Iraq, has been paid nearly $32 billion since 2001. The commission says billions of dollars of that amount ended up wasted due to poorly defined work orders, inadequate oversight and contractor inefficiencies.

KBR’s chairman William P. Utt responded to the allegations by saying, more or less, “Liar, liar, pants on fire.” According to the AP report, his exact words were: “As we look back on what we’ve done, we’re real proud . . . .” You can bank on his pride in what the company has accomplished, all right. Raking in $32 billion in less than a decade for providing workaday services to the U.S. troops in Iraq is no mean achievement, as contractor rip-offs go.

Many readers will interpret this latest news item as evidence of the government’s “failed policies” for managing the Iraq war, but this interpretation is completely wrong. There are no failed government policies — at least, none that last very long. The government is accomplishing exactly what it seeks to accomplish. If it were not doing so, it would soon change the policies to bring them into accord with its aims.

If you doubt my claim, you may wish to consider that these very “failed policies” in military contracting have remained business as usual ever since World War II, when the modern military-industrial-congressional complex (the MICC) came into being. They have been the subject of countless investigations and several major studies throughout that span of nearly seventy-years. Each study finds basically the same thing; each makes similar proposals to fix the system; but the government never alters the system’s basic workings.

In Arms, Politics, and the Economy, a book edited by me and published by Holmes & Meier in cooperation with The Independent Institute in 1990, William E. Kovacic presents a detailed account of three “blue-ribbon commissions” created to study military contracting and related matters: the 1955 Hoover Commission Task Force, the 1970 Fitzhugh Commission, and the 1986 Packard Commission. Kovacic concludes: “As judged by most who have studied postwar movements to reform the weapons acquisition process, blue ribbon commissions have elicited little basic change in the way the United States buys armaments.  . . . Experience with the postwar blue ribbon commissions demonstrates that the inspiration to reform without the commitment to persevere yields little change.”

I am willing to say bluntly what Kovacic never quite concludes in plain language: Nothing changes fundamentally because the investigations are all for show, to give the public the impression that the government is not simply shoveling the taxpayers’ money heedlessly into the contractors’ bank accounts, but none of the leading actors in the MICC—not the military services or the Department of Defense, not the private contractors, not the congressional appropriations and oversight committees—really wants to change the system because, as it now stands, it is serving their interests magnificently.

As the legendary defense analyst Ernest Fitzgerald once said to me, “A defense contract is just a license to steal.” And who wouldn’t want to have such a license? You can bet that KBR enjoys having one, as do Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, Raytheon, and the rest of the major licensees. Indeed, it appears that the U.S. military-contracting system constitutes one of the most successful organized-crime rackets in the history of the world.

  • Catalyst
  • Beyond Homeless
  • MyGovCost.org
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