Europe’s Resurgent Far-Right

The Associated Press explained what had happened in France’s parliamentary elections in the eighteenth paragraph of its July 8 story: “Rather than rallying behind [President Emmanuel] Macron,” AP reported, “millions took the vote as an opportunity to vent anger about inflation, crime, immigration and other grievances.” 

In the end, the beneficiary of the discontent was the far-left New Popular Front (NPF), an alliance of communists, climate change activists, populists and socialists who have veered away from social democracy. The NPF agglomeration won the most seats in the National Assembly (180-plus), the much-diminished centrists led by Macron came in second (with more than 160 seats) and the National Rally, the far-right nationalist, populist party led by Marine Le Pen, finished third (with 140-plus seats). This fell far short of the majority many feared National Rally would achieve after winning (with its allies) some 10.5 million votes in the first round of voting, comfortably ahead of the NPF and Macron’s Renaissance Party candidates. 

But that was before Macron cut a deal with the NPF, with each side withdrawing its candidates in districts where the other was stronger, effectively undercutting National Rally candidates. 

Although the European parties usually described as “far-right” are heterogeneous, the various forms of nationalism, populism, Euroscepticism and very assertive conservatism associated with them are on the rise, as seen in the recent European Parliament elections. 

How should existing mainstream parties deal with them? Should they form coalitions to help them phase into the “system” or establish a “cordon sanitaire” to keep them away from the government and other national and European institutions? 

So far, the northern Europeans, particularly the Scandinavians, have opted for the first option. In contrast, Germany, Spain and now France have opted for the second. In some countries, the far-right, such as Italy’s Brothers of Italy party (headed by a woman, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni), Austria’s Freedom Party, Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, and Poland’s Jaroslaw Kaczyński already gained power. In Italy, the government turned out to be more “right” than “far,” while in Hungary, the opposite happened. There is no definitive formula.

What’s driving the popularity of Europe’s far-right? Behind the grievances cited above is the failure of Europe’s and France’s socioeconomic models.

In France, for example, government spending now accounts for close to 60% of all economic activity in the country, generating huge government deficits (5.5% of Gross Domestic Product this year) and debt (now amounting to 111% of GDP) and crowding out private investment. 

The size of the national government and its regulatory burdens are compounded by the European Union, which intervenes through its mammoth bureaucracy in all 27 EU economies. 

The result is tragic: In the EU’s four largest economies, productivity growth has plummeted from about 7% several decades ago to zero today. The success of some major French corporations is due to their ability to survive in this stifling environment and, perhaps more importantly, to crony capitalism. Meanwhile, France’s economy is stagnant and three-fourths of French households are now receiving some form of government aid.

France is not alone. Since 2008, per capita income in the EU has grown at an anemic average rate of 0.6% per year, half the rate of increase in the United States (also far from adequate, but that’s another matter)—and far below the rate of inflation, especially since the pandemic. 

This stagnation has translated into scant upward social mobility and increasing frustration with the government and the European bureaucracy, which many blame for their problems. The backlash against immigration should be seen in this light. 

Even in open and free societies, large inflows of outsiders tend to be met, at least initially, with suspicion. In societies where most people overwhelmingly depend on the government and are unable to partake in the “blessings” of crony capitalism, it becomes an infinitely more sensitive issue (compounded, in France and several other countries, by militant minorities who operate among Muslim immigrants and provide fodder to xenophobic groups).

This does not imply that more flexible, wealth-generating societies are totally immune from similar problems. The United States has a more open and flexible system than Europe (although it is a far cry from what it once was), and immigration is also a major political flashpoint. 

But a system in which individual initiative, innovation, and investment are still encouraged and where people feel they still have a chance to succeed and prosper would provide Europe’s true liberals with a much stronger foundation to fight back against both the far-left and the nationalist populists.