Biological Determinism, as with Marxist Determinism, is Folly
By David J. Theroux • Sunday October 11, 2009 10:36 AM PDT • 20 Comments
James Montanye’s recent posting on reciprocal rights theory and altruism provides the standard evolutionary biological (evo-devo) view, but as such fails to explain pure altruism or “radical altruism” and is inadequate to defend any consistent system of political economy and morality, including natural law and natural rights, individual liberty and the rule of law. As the analytic philosopher Alvin Plantinga has shown in his book, Warrant and Proper Function, the evo-devo, naturalist, reductionist attempt to explain morality, free will and reason is self-refuting. In this regard, here also is Plantinga’s essay, “Naturalism Defeated.”
In effect, Montanye’s claim that “Politics, both for better and for worse, is an expression of biology” is fundamentally flawed as are all materialistic, determinist models (e.g., Hobbes, Hume, Marx, Darwin, Freud, Skinner, etc.).
1. If all human action is based solely on self-interest, then choosing pure sacrifice vs. pure narcissism ends up in an unworkable dilemma since they both cannot be “fit” for survival. The man who seeks to pet a tiger is not as “fit” as a man who runs away. But in choosing, the man can make a gigantic multiplicity of choices that can also avoid his being eaten, but since only one choice is true, the probability that he will choose false assessments of reality is virtually assured. He may decide that the tiger is a ghost and run away or that the sky is green and run away or that there are witches in the trees and run away or that two plus two is five and run away, etc., etc. The probability of his choosing the truth is virtually non-existent, and the evo-devo theorist fails because in assuming that all brain states make selections solely based of “fitness,” he rules out the existence of reason and free will in the process. Such evo-devo reductionist scenarios end up as speculative “just so stories” that do not explain at all but instead conform to a naturalist ideological presupposition.
2. In addition, if all of human behavior is simply matter in motion, determined mechanically and materialistically by “fitness” as somehow programmed by the laws of physics, then no thought, including the theory of evolutionary biology itself, can be known to be true or not. Indeed, no free will to infer and make arguments can exist since all human thought is merely bio-chemical reactions determined genetically. Such reductionism refutes itself because all human inferences (including those Montanye has made here) assume as pre-conditions the properly basic knowledge that his mind, free will and other minds do exist, refuting his very theory. Hence, all human inferences necessarily first assume a metaphysical dualism (substance dualism) which means that evo-devo alone cannot explain reality.
3. Moreover, if morality is based solely on reciprocity, then no objective standard exists to determine what is or is not moral other than subjective self-interest. The evo-devo advocate then tries to conflate the “is” with the “ought” but ends up in an unworkable dilemma. As such, if someone believes that using invasive violence against another (e.g., murder, theft, rape, etc.) can advance one’s own interest and the chance of being caught is slim to non-existent, then morality (“fitness”) for this person equals aggression against the innocent because all morality is merely subjective and situational. For the evo-devo advocate, the man “is” capable of doing harm to benefit himself and necessarily “ought” to do so since only “fitness” applies. Hence, Nazi ethics would be equivalent to Thomist or Jeffersonian ethics, depending upon the situation because “fitness” assumes that there is no objective standard and that all brain states and truth are subjective. Indeed, this is the dilemma that all utilitarian-rights theorists have in trying to achieve a standard for morality and explains the historical decline of classical liberal thought which once abandoning natural law theory was left clinging to the shifting sands of moral subjectivism. Interestingly enough, since radical altruism has been considered the highest standard for human behavior in societies worldwide since the dawn of mankind, this powerful evidence for natural law suggests that self-interested “fitness” cannot explain morality.
In Plato’s The Republic, Socrates is presented with the story of “The Ring of Gyges” in which Glaucon asks whether objective morality exists or self-interest is the only standard. Socrates responds by refuting subjectivism as the basis for morality. In this regard, here is a video that discusses why the subjective/utilitarian theory of morality is incoherent, self-refuting, and in fact the basis for all of the tyrannies in history.
And C.S. Lewis’s superb book The Abolition of Man (also available free online here) is highly recommended in refuting subjectivism in aesthetics, epistemology, and moral ethics.
Tags: Civil Liberties, Civil Society, Economics, Free Market, Law, Morality, Natural Law, Personal Liberty, Philosophy, Property Rights, Religion, Science, Utilitarianism 
Re: Objective moral standards — “Of course it is true that the kind of things we value has to do with the kind of things we are, and evolutionary science helps to account for that. It does not follow that those values are unreal or subjective. Think of the faculty of vision. Seeing is accomplished by brain equipment that evolved because of its contributions to survival and reproduction. But that doesn’t imply that the objects of vision – the rivers, faces, street signs – are any less real. Indeed, the reality of the objects around us helps us explain why we have the faculty to detect them. Evolved faculties can connect us with objective facts.” Austin Dacey, The Secular Conscience
Eric Johnson | Oct 11, 2009 | Reply
Re: C.S. Lewis — From John Beversluis book C.S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion: “Part of my purpose in this book to show, by means of example after example, the extent to which the apparent cogency of [Lewis’] arguments depends on his rhetoric rather than on his logic… Once his arguments are stripped of their powerful rhetorical content, their apparent cogency largely vanishes and their apparent persuasiveness largely evaporates. The reason is clear: it is not the logic, but the rhetoric that is doing most of the work. We will have occasion to see this again and again. In short, my purpose in this book is not just to show that Lewis’ arguments are flawed. I also want to account for their apparent plausibility and explain why they have managed to convince so many readers.”
Eric Johnson | Oct 11, 2009 | Reply
Just to be clear: you’re suggesting that morality comes from a dualist mind/body separation model, presumably from religion? And you’re willing to back *that* theory against the same level of attack as you gave here to evolutionary theory (which, btw, I think you are gravely misunderstanding... or rather: there are a number of variants, and you are cherry picking one because it doesn’t fit with your own beliefs)?
Andy Cleary | Oct 13, 2009 | Reply
Eric and Andy,
1. Regarding the quote from Dacey, I would suggest the following from Alvin Plantinga:
“The naturalist can be reasonably sure that the neurophysiology underlying belief formation is adaptive, but nothing follows about the truth of the beliefs depending on that neurophysiology. In fact he’d have to hold that it is unlikely, given unguided evolution, that our cognitive faculties are reliable. It’s as likely, given unguided evolution, that we live in a sort of dream world as that we actually know something about ourselves and our world.
“If this is so, the naturalist has a defeater for the natural assumption that his cognitive faculties are reliable—a reason for rejecting that belief, for no longer holding it. (Example of a defeater: suppose someone once told me that you were born in Michigan and I believed her; but now I ask you, and you tell me you were born in Brazil. That gives me a defeater for my belief that you were born in Michigan.) And if he has a defeater for that belief, he also has a defeater for any belief that is a product of his cognitive faculties. But of course that would be all of his beliefs—including naturalism itself. So the naturalist has a defeater for naturalism; naturalism, therefore, is self-defeating and cannot be rationally believed.
“The real problem here, obviously, is Dawkins’ [ed: or Dacey] naturalism, his belief that there is no such person as God or anyone like God. That is because naturalism implies that evolution is unguided. So a broader conclusion is that one can’t rationally accept both naturalism and evolution; naturalism, therefore, is in conflict with a premier doctrine of contemporary science. People like Dawkins hold that there is a conflict between science and religion because they think there is a conflict between evolution and theism; the truth of the matter, however, is that the conflict is between science and naturalism, not between science and belief in God.”
Please also see the following books:
Plantinga, Alvin. Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford University Press, 1993).
Plantinga, Alvin. Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford University Press, 2000).
You may also be interested in the debates in 2004 (Purdue University) and 2005 (California State University, Fresno) between William Lane Craig and Austin Dacey, “Does God Exist?”.
2. The Beversluis quote pertaining to C.S. Lewis’s “argument from reason” is merely a claim that does not address the points I (and Lewis and Plantinga) have raised. Beversluis’s book itself incidentally has been refuted in numerous places, including the following:
Reppert, Victor. C.S. Lewis’s Dangerous Idea: In Defense of the Argument from Reason (InterVarsity Press, 2003)
You may also find the following article of interest:
Reppert, Victor. The Argument from Reason. PhiLo vol. 2, no. 1 (Spring-Summer 1999).
3. Andy, what I am saying is that metaphysical naturalism is self-refuting and substance dualism is necessarily true. Moreover, every human inference assumes dualism to be true. Perhaps the following will also be of interest:
Theroux, David J. Economic Science and the Poverty of Naturalism: C. S. Lewis’s “Argument from Reason.” Journal of Private Enterprise vol. 23, no. 2 (Spring 2008).
Goetz, Stewart. Naturalism and Libertarian Agency. In William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland, eds., Naturalism: A Critical Analysis. (Routledge, 2000).
Goetz, Stewart and Charles Taliferro. Naturalism. (Eerdmans, 2008).
Moreland, J.P. Consciousness and the Existence of God: A Theist Argument. (Routledge, 2009).
David Theroux | Oct 13, 2009 | Reply
“The naturalist can be reasonably sure that the neurophysiology underlying belief formation is adaptive, but nothing follows about the truth of the beliefs depending on that neurophysiology. In fact he’d have to hold that it is unlikely, given unguided evolution, that our cognitive faculties are reliable. It’s as likely, given unguided evolution, that we live in a sort of dream world as that we actually know something about ourselves and our world.”
As I said, you misunderstand “evo devo” if you think this is accurate. Of *course* there’s a reason to expect that our cognitive faculties are a more accurate and useful facility than “a dream world”: because they worked, as measured by their having been selected by natural selection!
Perhaps you misunderstand what advantage is actually given by our (and every other life-form’s, no matter how simple and limited) mental faculties: they help us to *predict* and *control* reality in ways that are advantageous to “us” (actually, to our genes, but the distinction isn’t particularly important here).
Consider some hunter-gatherers sitting in the rain. One uses their mental faculties to *predict* that “staying out in the rain lead to bad health”, and then further uses their mental faculties to decide that “moving out of rain avoid bad health from rain”. Another one makes the correct prediction, but does not do the control work, and so stays in the rain. Another doesn’t make the prediction at all, and stays in the rain. It is clear that the most “fit” individual here is the first one, the one that uses mental faculties to predict and control reality to their advantage.
Let’s now add a 4th one: someone whose brain feeds him “dreamlike” images of the world that aren’t accurate or real. What good is *that* for his evolutionary fitness?? How could such a thing possibly evolve?
Perhaps your commitment to Intelligent Design (whether you have said that or not isn’t clear, but the form of your argument – find some sophist argument that it can’t be evolution and then apply the fallacy of the False Dichotomy to conclude “it must be God”) has blinded you to the deeper workings of natural selection theory. When you think that quotes like the above are compelling, or that this is “That is because naturalism implies that evolution is unguided”, it displays a real lack of understanding of what evolutionists are even *saying*. No evolutionist says that “evolution is unguided”, they just say it is not guided by the *supernatural*. It is very much guided by the logic of natural selection, however, and that logic is inexorable. The entire Plantinga article – and yes, I read it, as painful as it was – is based on false premises and misunderstandings.
Meanwhile, any Intelligent Design argument falls apart in 5 seconds due to recursion: if a complex life form requires a *more* complex life form to create it, then who creates the creator? And who creates the creator’s creator? It requires an infinite number of steadily more complex creators.
I love the economics and political posts on this blog, but the continued occasional arguments for religion and ID are as out of place – and as jarring – as someone playing the chalkboard with their nails in the New York philharmonic. It’s your blog, but it takes a *lot* away from the credibility of the Beacon, and I’d suggest choosing another venue for it. It is hard for me to point people at the Beacon to read, say, Dr Higgs on economics, knowing that they might run into one of these religious posts.
Andy Cleary | Oct 14, 2009 | Reply
Andy,
You still have not addressed the points I have made.
As I have noted, Plantinga has shown in his work that if chance and survival rules are the sole factors in creating human behavior, there is no reason to believe that any brain state is true or not because the concept of “true” does not exist. Moreover, “reason” and “free will” also do not exist separate from the laws of physics that allegedly and solely guide all human action. Naturalism means that there is no objective ground for making independent assessments and that all choices are strictly subjective. But all of science requires observers whose own views are not determined by the system that they are examining, and such human assessments can only be made by comparing results to some objective standard. But you are claiming that no independent, non-physicalist standard exists! As a result, if scientists’ own minds are also fully dependent on the physical system that they observe, there exists no basis for knowing whether their choices are true because they are simply the determined product of the unfolding of physical events guided by physical laws.
Interestingly enough, all scientists necessarily assume a methodological dualism for them to pursue scientific enterprises. And you are doing the same in making your own inferences and seeking to convince me of your conclusions.
In addition, science itself is not some free floating empiricism or positivism. Science only exists as an idea on how to assess the natural world based on the prior (properly basis) metaphysical knowledge that the scientist has a mind and free will and that there exist other minds to communicate with and a world that is orderly in which assessments can be made that will have consistent merit (truth). This knowledge is tautological and is a necessary precondition for any concept of science. In other words, this truth means that all of science rests upon a non-refutable, metaphysical reality that naturalism alone is unable to explain.
Incidentally and regarding your dismissive comments regarding metaphysics, I would note that our entire lives depend upon such knowledge. All ideas are unseen and metaphysical, including our own minds, free will, economic laws, information theory, numbers, multiplication tables, moral ethics, laws of physics, bedtime stories, love, film themes, music, etc. This is no way makes them any less real. On the contrary, they are very real, and reality rests upon such metaphysics. This is not to say that all ideas are true or good, but simply that they exist as real entities and our minds (souls) are completely defined by and focused on such unseen things.
Your example of the hunter-gatherers does not refute the points that Plantinga has made. Note that you use the term “correct” in describing that they “decide” to be “fit.” But such terms are based on some objective standard (purpose) you are sneaking into the discussion. In other words, on what basis should any or all of the hunter-gatherers survive at all, any more than any other component of the natural world? Is an ice crystal more “fit” if it grows or melts? Is a rock more “fit” if it runs down hill or stays put? Is a volcano more “fit” if it is dormant or active? In this case, you sneak in “fitness” as a metaphysical (in this case pantheistic) value judgment to describe the “guiding” of biological change, and by doing so, you are asserting that the goal-driving nature of fitness functions somehow predominates over the laws of physics. But, if fitness functions are solely artifacts of the laws of physics and determined by certain environmental conditions, then they cannot predominate—they simply are and all outcomes are equivalent. Whether the hunter-gatherers or any life form survives or not is meaningless and they themselves can have no sense of “fitness” or “deciding” or what is “correct” because they are simply matter in motion. Yet, you firmly (and correctly) believe that “fitness,” “decisions,” and “correctness” are real and true because life does indeed exist and behaves in certain ways, but this cannot explain the matter as this knowledge cannot be merely physical. Your assertions reduce to “just-so” stories that describe situations but do not explain them.
But even if “fitness” somehow becomes such an objective standard naturalistically, there is no reason to believe that any particular brain state is more “correct” than another. The hunter-gatherers may survive by having certain brain states, but without “reason” as an independent faculty they and we have no basis to suspect that their theory of the rain is “correct” or “true.” But even more damaging is Plantinga’s point that with an unlimited array of possible brain states, many of which can have “fit” outcomes but still be false, the probability that the one true state is selected by chance and simple rules is essentially zero. Again, an objective standard must exist independent of physicalism for us to assess anything, and you cannot have it both ways that only physicalism exists and yet a magical “fitness” somehow guides the process.
You are of course free to presume an atheology of metaphysical naturalism in which the universe is a mechanism ruled by physical laws and that everything exists strictly in such terms. But, as I have noted, such a view fails to explain reality and is self-refuting by denying the existence of truth and the very rational faculties and intelligent/libertarian agency that you must possess to make any claims. (And, no such determinist model can have anything to say about liberty, economic laws, or moral ethics.) Needless to say, by assuming that only a physicalist reality can be true, you clearly then cannot come to a conclusion of any non-material reality (because you have already ruled this out), regardless of the evidence. Indeed, those “scientists” who assume only a materialistic (naturalist) metaphysics are in fact not scientific, just as those scientists who claimed at the outset that the planets revolved around the Earth were unable to conclude that a heliocentric system was actually the case.
Finally, you then wildly throw in such a question as “who creates the creator?”, but this was long ago resolved by Aristotle and Plato. In Aristotle’s case, it was a simple matter of his “first unmoved mover.” Plato resolved the matter through his recognition of substance dualism. The further development of the Kalam cosmological argument provided a logical deduction that since by definition no infinite series of events can arrive at any finite point such as now, the universe had a finite beginning that had to be caused by something non-material, non-temporal, etc. (i.e., something definitionally original and non-contingent). And since no time, matter and space can exist without the metaphysical laws of physics, such laws are a precondition for physical reality to exist. Hence, mind precedes matter, just as you must assume every time you make an inference of any kind.
Hence and as is demonstrated by your strongly volunteering your own views, the matters we are discussing are entirely germane to discussions of political economy. Do humans have free will and rights, does objective truth and morality exist, etc.? Indeed, most of the great scholars of liberty all thought so (e.g., Aquinas, Locke, Madison, Montesquieu, Smith, Bastiat, Say, Menger, Tocqueville, Acton, etc.), and this is why liberty only took root via a natural law worldview that understood that determinism of any kind was inherently false.
David Theroux | Oct 14, 2009 | Reply
David Theroux challenges the biological view of Mankind’s behavioral nature. His comments rest on an epistemological argument fashioned by the analytic philosopher Alvain Plantinga, who casts “certain doubts about the reliability of our [evolved] cognitive faculties.” Plantinga summarizes his book-length argument within a short essay, Naturalism Defeated (1994), to which Theroux provides a hypertext Internet link:
Now according to traditional Christian (and Jewish and Muslim) thought, we human beings have been created in the image of God. This means, among other things, that he created us with the capacity for achieving knowledge—knowledge of our environment by way of perception, of other people by way of something like what Thomas Reid calls sympathy, of the past by memory and testimony, of mathematics and logic by reason, of morality, our own mental life, God himself, and much more. And the above evolutionary account of our origins is compatible with the theistic view that God has created us in his image. So evolutionary theory taken by itself (without the patina of philosophical naturalism that often accompanies expositions of it) is not as such in tension with the idea that God has created us and our cognitive faculties in such a way that the latter are reliable, that (as the medievals like to say) there is an adequation of intellect to reality. But if naturalism is true, there is no God, and hence no God (or anyone else) overseeing our development and orchestrating the course of our evolution. And this leads directly to the question whether it is at all likely that our cognitive faculties, given naturalism and given their evolutionary origin, would have developed in such a way as to be reliable, to furnish us with mostly true beliefs. (1994, footnotes omitted, italics added),
From this epistemological foundation, Theroux asserts, “... all human inferences necessarily first assume a metaphysical dualism (substance dualism) which means that that [sic] evo-devo alone [a reference to evolutionary biology’s explanations of human behavior] cannot explain reality.” Ergo, he concludes, “In effect, [the claim I raise in my Beacon blog “Spreading the Wealth: An Introduction to Political Biology”] that ‘Politics, both for better and for worse, is an expression of biology’ is fundamentally flawed as are all materialistic, determinist models (e.g., Hobbs, Hume, Marx, Darwin, Skinner, etc.).”
I disagree with David’s assessment and conclusion and, moreover, believe his comments are an unjust characterization of the biological perspective. Our dueling blog entries surely will not drive to apostasy any true believers on either side of the ongoing naturalistic–theistic debate (my forthcoming article, “Civilization Without Romance.” Essays in the Philosophy of Humanism 17:2 [Fall/Winter 2009], might produce somewhat greater effects at the margin). His comments nevertheless warrant a respectful surrebuttal.
In ¶1, Theroux asserts, “... the evo-devo theorist fails because in assuming that all brain states make selections solely based of [sic] ‘fitness,’ he rules out the existence of reason and free will in the process. Such evo-devo reductionist scenarios end up as speculative ‘just so stories’ that do not explain at all but instead conform to a naturalist ideological presupposition.”
First, library shelves worldwide groan under the weight of scientific discoveries regarding the relationship between evolution and sociobiology on one hand, and all manner of human behavior (including religious behavior) on the other. To imply that this work reflects nothing more than confirmation of some speculative “naturalistic ideological presupposition” is as nonsensical as arguing that the practical significance of these discoveries is diminished, no less negated, by clever, Catch-22 epistemological arguments like Plantinga’s.
Second, it is evolution, rather than “brain states” per se, that selects for behaviors on the basis of fitness.
Third, it is simply wrong to claim that naturalism rules out the existence of reason and free will. Consider, for example, the following statement by the distinguished behavioral biologist E.O Wilson: “The human mind is a device for survival and reproduction, and reason is just one of its various techniques” (On Human Nature, 1978, p. 2. See also my essay, “The Apotheosis of American Democracy.” The Independent Review 11:1 [Summer 2006]). Disparaging behavioral biology as “evo-devo” does not alter these facts (at least to the extent that our evolved, cognitive facilities are capable of knowing them reliably).
In ¶2, Theroux first asserts, “‘fitness’ [is] somehow programmed by the laws of physics.” Fitness, in fact, is a consequence of natural selection which responds to, and is constrained by, the laws of physics.
Second, he asserts, “... all human inferences [including mine] necessarily first assume a metaphysical dualism (substance dualism [e.g., presumably, mind/body dualism]) which means that that [sic] evo-devo alone cannot explain reality.” The implication here is that some form or blend of theism and/or deism is a necessary explanatory complement to evolution. But theism and deism are themselves “speculative ‘just so stories’” (see ¶1, supra) derived from arguments by scriptural and theological authority rather than from scientific discovery. Theroux can’t have his “just so stories” both ways. I deny, incidently, that my inferences are contingent upon any metaphysical dualism.
In ¶3, Theroux asserts, “For the evo-devo advocate, the man ‘is’ capable of doing harm to benefit himself and necessarily ‘ought’ to do so since only ‘fitness’ applies. Hence, Nazi ethics would be equivalent to Thomist or Jeffersonian ethics, depending upon the situation because ‘fitness’ assumes that there is no objective standard and that all brain states and truth are subjective.”
First, any self-respecting “evo-devo advocate” recognizes that “is” does not imply “ought;” naturalists are not professionally obliged to commit the Hume/Moore naturalistic fallacy. Individuals, like self-interested business organizations, ordinarily do well by doing good rather than by doing evil. It is for this reason that evolution was able to select for reciprocal altruism; i.e., for behaviors reflecting cooperation, reciprocity, and trust. Individuals who behave as if they “ought” to do evil simply because they “can” do evil are unlikely to prosper in the long run; people and businesses of this ilk often wind up prematurely dead in the absence of compassionate positive law. Evolved behaviors thus reflect, among other things, beneficial feedback (cybernetic) effects whose consequences are remarkably similar to the sunny behaviors that philosophers term “moral” and “ethical.” Self-interested reciprocal altruism admittedly is neither moral by intention, nor is it tantamount to, or does it give rise to, “pure altruism” (i.e., behavior without a self-interest component). That is because pure altruism outside of the family is chimerical.
Second, asserting that “fitness” assumes away objective standards for “brain states and truth” is refuted by Mankind’s very existence in a universe characterized by the objective standards of resource scarcity and evolutionary indifference.
Third, I contend that practical questions of “truth” are better addressed by philosophical pragmatists like William James, John Dewey, and Richard Rorty, who argue that “truth” is whatever works, rather than by analytic philosophers and epistemologists like Alvin Plantinga. Consider Rorty: “... the idea of truth as correspondence to reality [i.e., objective truth] might gradually be replaced by the idea of truth as what comes to be believed in the course of free and open encounters” (Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 1989, p. 68). In the limit, “truth” emerges even from such fact-free encounters as the moral philosopher Harry Frankfurt pellucidly calls “bullshit” (On Bullshit, 2005).
Fourth, Thomas Aquinas speaks for himself (in translation) on human nature and natural law:
“There is in people an appetite for the good of their nature as rational, and this is proper to them, that they should know the truths about God and about living in society. ... whatever this involves is a matter of natural law.” (Summa theologica, Ia q.94, a.2)
The truth about living in society is that human beings relate to each other as they are – i.e., as Homo sapiens – and not as the sort of creatures that clever foundationalist epistemologists and freelance moralists often wish them to be. Jefferson’s morality as a slaveholder speaks for itself.
James A. Montanye | Oct 15, 2009 | Reply
David,
It is difficult to jump into the conversation between you and the other commentators because every paragraph you’ve written is chock-full of explicit or implicit metaphysical or philosophical positions on such weighty topics as truth, free will, materialism, meaning and values. The interesting thing is that I believe I have different positions (from you) on almost every topic. Addressing all these differences could be rewarding, but may prove overwhelming.
I would like to focus on an over-arching theme, namely your position on truth. You seem to feel truth is a necessary precondition of science. I would be more in the camp of such philosophers of science as Larry Laudan “Progress and Its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth” who believe that science is not about truth or even rationality but about problem solving. Rationality serves problem solving, not vice versa. Good theories solve important problems better than less good theories.
Good science solves more problems with greater breadth, depth, consistency and simplicity than bad science. Good science involves good explanations.
Your example of our inability to come up with accurate explanations for something as simple as running from a tiger is a great starting place for the learning process that attempts to come up with good explanations and that eventually weaves together the processes of evolution, culture, logic, math and science. You are of course completely correct that there are an infinite number of explanations for why I should run from a tiger. Taken alone, there is no point in even coming up with an explanation, just following our instincts will work fine (biology solved this problem long ago!). The point of explanations though is that we do not have one isolated experience, we have a stream of non-stop experiences — thousands each and every day — and by coming up with explanations, we can begin to corroborate and generalize.
The power of good explanations is in their ability to solve future similar problems. If I run from a tiger and explain it as a compelling desire to brush my teeth, I am faced with the paradox of why antelope run from tigers — “gee that’s odd, they don’t even brush their teeth” — why other prey run from other predators, why I run from other predators, why I still run while brushing my teeth.
Explanations weave together experiences and give us the ability to solve future novel experiences. Still, I doubt a non-speaking proto-human would have much of a role for explanations or have much skill in forming good ones. Their real power comes from integrating, sharing and combining the cumulative experiences of hundreds or thousands of people having thousands of experiences. “We run from tigers to avoid being eaten” is a much better explanation that is supported from thousands of collective experiences and observations. It is simple, useful, consistent with observations and consistent with all our other explanations. It has survived the selective pressures of tens of thousands of years of cultural and biological time.
The laws of logic, math and science build upon these practical rules. At one time, “things fall because down is their natural state” was a great explanation. Newton came up with an even broader, better, more inclusive explanation. Einstein came up with an even better one a few hundred years later. But is it true? Who knows. What science recognizes is not dogmatism toward truth but toward good explanations that solve problems. It is always open to better solutions.
In the end, evolution, culture, economics and science are all about solving problems. And yes, values, free will, life, morality, ideas, the rule of law, and meaning all emerge from these processes. But those are separate topics...
R.D. Parker
R D Parker | Oct 19, 2009 | Reply
Roger,
1. Your view falls into the same contradictory, epistemological, subjectivist category as that of Montayne that somehow truth is simply “fitness.” Yet in making such (or any) claim, you are necessarily making an inference that a certain concept is correct and others are not, which of course the subjectivist is claiming is not possible. In other words, every time you make an assertion, you are claiming something to be true and others false. And to do so, you are comparing outcomes to some objective ground of what “correct” or “good” (as in your use of the term “good” science) means, and in this case “fitness.” For example, you note that the statement that “If I run from a tiger and explain it as a compelling desire to brush my teeth” is false, but on what basis? Clearly the statement is “fit” for the survival of the person involved and hence for you must be “true,” but what difference does such a brain state make? Yes, if other creatures have a different brain state that produces the same outcome, this affects the environment in which the brain state operates. But so what? If only the laws of physics are the determining factors, every unguided brain state is equivalent (and hence “true” as you define it) and “fitness” can equally mean death or life for the person since neither outcome is “true” or “good,” but instead simply is. The point here is that the concepts of “fitness” and “choice” are snuck in as objective concepts by evo-devo advocates in addition to the already recognized objectivity of the laws of physics in order to explain life forms and assess outcomes, while “fitness” and “choice” are not used for non-life forms such as rocks or crystals. In effect, the biological subjectivist must utilize a form of dualism in order to be coherent in assessing reality because reality, including the evo-devo advocate’s own claim, cannot be explained simply in terms of chance and the laws of physics.
2. In your discussion about the origins of humans having the capacity to make explanations, you also assume the answer as another “just-so story” by stating that “biology solved this problem long ago!” But my point is that biological determinism does not explain “explanations” or even the consciousness necessary to have minds and the free will and reason needed. Plantinga’s critique of naturalism is devastating here and there is simply no response possible because all assessments must first recognize a dualism that the mind is a precondition for science to exist and for you to make any rational inferences whatsoever. If you instead assume that humans are simply matter in motion, there is no point when the independent standing of reason and free will can enter the picture since for the evo-devo advocate all is always determined mechanically. And predictably, virtually all biological determinists incoherently deny the existence of free will:
For example, according to Bertrand Russell, “The first dogma which I came to disbelieve was that of free will. It seemed to me that all notions of matter were determined by the laws of dynamics and could not therefore be influenced by human wills.”
Or from Marvin Minsky at MIT: “The human mind is a computer made of meat.” “Everything, including that which happens in our brains, depends on these and only these: A set of fixed, deterministic laws. A purely random set of accidents.”
Or from naturalist pundit Michael Shermer, “We feel free, but it’s a pseudo-free will. It’s not a real free will because there is no little person inside the head making decisions for you that isn’t affected by all causal variables in the world.”
Or from Tom Clark, Director of the Center for Naturalism, “There is no kernel of independent moral agency. . . We are not . . . ‘moral levitators’ that rise above circumstances in our choices, including choices to rob, rape, or kill. . . .” Clark then claims that denying free will presents no moral problem because by doing so, naturalists “encourage science-based, effective and progressive policies in areas such as criminal justice, social inequality, behavioral health, and the environment.” Yet he claims that “Supernatural contra-causal freedom really isn’t necessary for anything we hold near and dear, whether it’s personhood, morality, dignity, creativity, individuality, or a robust sense of human agency.”
3. Science is again not some free-floating concept. It is necessarily rooted in a prior metaphysical knowledge that you and others have minds and free will to make inferences, and the world is orderly. And as Plantinga and others have shown, the radical reductionism of biological (or any form of) determinism is trapped in an internal contradiction: either substance dualism is true that minds exist or all thought is determined physically, making the theory of naturalism itself meaningless. As C.S. Lewis noted in critiquing radical reductionism at the end of his book, The Abolition of Man:
The result of such reductionism in the modern world has been to undermine and even deny and oppose the objective concepts of “values, free will, life, morality, ideas, the rule of law, and meaning” that you so admirably quote your support for. In this regard, here is a paper by me that may be of interest: “Economic Science and the Poverty of Naturalism: C. S. Lewis’s ‘Argument from Reason,” (Journal of Private Enterprise, Spring 2008).
4. I should also point out that both Newton and Einstein were dualists, and for this reason they saw the universe, morality and logic, mathematics and science as real and not subjective. Yes, we are limited in our ability to know the full truth about anything, but we can learn a great deal because such truth exists to be discovered by our minds that are not biologically or environmentally determined. Truth, beauty and goodness are not illusions, as the pointless delusion of modernists and post-modernists has claimed.
David Theroux | Oct 19, 2009 | Reply
Egads, not Plantinga. His work against evolution has a serious flaw in it.
Plantinga’s Probability Arguments Against Evolutionary Naturalism
For example, Plantinga argues that Pr(R) (the probability that our psychological mechanism for forming reliable beliefs) as being close to 1. This can be dicey in a Bayesian setting.
In Bayesian reasoning we can write the following,
Pr(H|O)/Pr(H) = Pr(O|H)/Pr(O)
Where H is the hypothesis of interest, O is an observed phenomenon. Now, if Pr(O) = 1, then observing observation O does not confirm H. This follows since, Bayesian confirmation theory works when observing O, we get Pr(H|O) > Pr(H). Re-arranging that at bit we get
Pr(H|O)/Pr(H) > 1.
But assuming Pr(O) = 1 means that Pr(H|O)/Pr(H) is bounded above by 1. That is observing O, whe Pr(O)=1 does not confirm H.
Now Plantinga has stipulated that Pr(R) is close to 1, but not 1, but does that help him? If we have,
Pr(R|H) > Pr(R) aprox. = 1,
Then things are fine, but Plantinga has already stipulated that Pr(R|H) where H = E&N as being low. Whoops!
This is a property that Bayesians like to point out about Bayesian reasoning. The unsurprising observation is of little use, whereas the surprising observation is what can make or break an hypothesis.
Fitelson and Sober make the following argument,
The wet sidewalk (W) confirms the hypothesis that it has been raining. The fact that the sidewalk is wet shouldn’t lead you to assign this evidence a probability of unity. A reasonable assignment of of value to Pr(W) is is given by the fact that the sidewalk is rarely wet.
Fitelson and Sober continue with other problems with Plantinga’s work.
Plantinga also has a contradiction in his probabilities. Plantinga stipulates the following (sorry if this is repetative),
Pr(R) aprox. 1,
Pr(R|E&N) is low,
Pr(R|TT) is high,
Pr(E&N) and Pr(TT) are “comparable”.
R = Reliable psychological processes for forming beliefs.
E = Evolution gave rise to our cognitive abilities.
N = Naturalism.
TT = Traditional Theism.
Also that E&N and TT are exhaustive–i.e. the only two possible alternatives.
Now we can write the following:
Pr(R) = Pr(R|E&N)Pr(E&N) + Pr(R|TT)Pr(TT).
The above follows from the theorem of total probability (see Robert B. Ash, Real Analysis and Probability page 207). Since Pr(E&N) and Pr(TT) are close, they have to be close to 0.5. We can re-write Pr(R) as,
Pr(R) aprox. = (low)0.5 + (high)0.5 aprox. = 1.
Whoops! That is impossible. Try it out with excel and some test numbers. Set (low) = .2 and (high) = 0.8 then you get 0.5 which is not approximately 1! The probability assignments by Plantinga are nonsensical.
One way out: allow for yet another possibility or even possiblities to E&N and TT. Then we can lower Pr(E&N) and Pr(TT) to much smaller numbers. However, I don’t think you want to go down that road. To do this you must have Pr(X) have a much higher probability than Pr(TT) and Pr(E&N), that is X is, a priori, vastly more likely than either E&N and TT. And the implication is that if Pr(E&N|R) is low enough to reject naturalism, then we should also reject Traditional Theism. Whoops!
We could go down the following route,
Pr(R) aprox. = (low)(?) + (high)(?) aprox. = 1.
Now there is no contradiction, but P(E&N) must be close to zero and P(TT) close to 1. Once again the argument is fine, but bereft of any probative force. In other words, Plantinga is stacking the deck in his favor. Whooops!
I strongly recommend everyone read Fitelson and Sober’s critique.
Now that is funny given that Plantinga is using Bayesian reasoning which usually ends up retreating to subjectivist views of probability.
Steve Verdon | Oct 20, 2009 | Reply
Also, we can object to Pr(R) aprox. 1. Suppose we decompose R into three areas.
R(1) = Those primative beliefs–e.g. tigers are dangerous, RUN!!! Pr(R) = .999
R(2) = Beliefs on higher concepts–e.g. generally speaking Pr(A|B) = Pr(B|A). Pr(R) = 0.5
R(3) = Those areas where we have yet to develop beliefs. Pr(R) = ????, but for the sake of argument lets say, 0.7.
Now if Pr(R) = Pr(R(1))Pr(R(2))Pr(R(3)) = 0.35, not anywhere “close” to 1, IMO.
So, why should we accept that Pr(R) is “close” to 1 in general?
Plantinga’s work is...well seriously lacking for a probabilistic perspective. Its almost like he just discovered probablity theory and Bayesian reasoning and managed to work himself into a nice neat corner.
Seems to happen alot with people ho want to find a flaw with the concepts of naturalism and evolution. For example there is the anthropic principle which actually provides, if anything, weak evidence in favor of naturalism.
Steve Verdon | Oct 20, 2009 | Reply
Steve,
You are correct in your two posts but not current in the scholarly literature that Plantinga made an error in chapter 12 on his book, Warrant and Proper Function (WPF) (Oxford University Press, 1993). Plantinga recognized the error himself before the 1997 Fitelson/Sober paper was even published as he was a scholarly peer reviewer for the paper when it was being considered for publication in the Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. He then corrected the error nine years ago in his subsequent book, Warranted Christian Belief (WCB) (Oxford University Press, 2000), a book I referenced in my comment above. I refer you specifically to pages 229-240 in WCB. As he noted:
Plantinga then goes on to present two interpretations based on the relevant application of Bayes’s Theorem:
Plantinga then proceeds to show that in each case, naturalism fails because it is self-refuting (has a defeater).
Incidentally, at the end of the Fitelson and Sober’s paper, they echo some of Plantinga’s findings even before he makes the correction by stating the following:
As a result of Plantinga’s correction, his analysis holds fast that biological determinism is false and indeed self-refuting.
David Theroux | Oct 20, 2009 | Reply
I disagree with this statement. As I noted above we might decompose R into subsets and while for some subsets Pr(R|X) may or may not be high, there is no reason to thing that it is true for the subsets, even if X = T. For example, we know that people have issues with conditional probabilities (e.g. Alvin Plantinga himself, but if that’s too snarky there are things like the Allais paradox, the Ellsberg paradox, the Monty Hall problem, and so forth). This is an observed fact, and doesn’t sit too well with Plantinga’s assumptions.
Also, I don’t see how his correction helps, is he now saying that Pr(R) is not close to 1? Because unless he is, the contradiction still would seem to apply. Well unless he is jettisoning his view that Pr(N) and Pr(T) are comparable. Frankly, I see no correction here.
Further Fitelson and Sober level a number of critiques, I just summarized two of them. Now I haven’t read the rest of the book you reference, but what about the rest of those criticisms?
And yes, Fitelson and Sober agree that Plantinga has raised a valid question, but I’d say that Fitelson and Sober argue that Plantinga takes it too far and his conclusion are unwarranted. As such, I don’t agree that naturalism is self-defeating. As I’ve already noted, people tend to be bad with conditional probabilities, but we also know this. That to me suggests that Plantinga’s approach is also probably too simplistic. So no, I don’t see Plantinga’s assertions as holding fast.
Steve Verdon | Oct 20, 2009 | Reply
Steve,
Perhaps then, you should do yourself a favor and actually read Plantinga’s books which address in great detail every form of naturalism, including versions and arguments I suspect you may not yet be familiar with.
David Theroux | Oct 20, 2009 | Reply
David,
Well, can you spell out exactly what this correction does? I don’t see it. Is he saying Pr(R) is no longer close to 1?
In fact, I’m trying to figure out what exactly this part means,
It seems to me he starts out with an admission that he confuses Pr(R) with Pr(R|B) where B is our background information. Then he brings in Pr(B) and states that he was confusing Pr(R|B) with Pr(B)! What? Sounds to me like he is still confused. Can you explain it?
Further, if we accept that Pr(R|B) is high, which seems reasonable. Then we need to reformulate the problem using Bayes theorem thusly,
Pr(N|R&B) = Pr(N|B)Pr(R|N&B)/Pr(R|B).
Since Pr(R|B) is close to one, we can rewrite this as,
Pr(N|R&B) = Pr(N|B)Pr(R|N&B).
Now, for Plantinga’s argument to work for all possible values of Pr(N|B) we need Pr(R|N&B) to be low. But why should that be the case? Because Pr(R|N) is low? I’d like to see a proof of that.
And to then turn around and start using
P(N|R) = (P(N) x P(R|N))/P(R)
and
P(T|R) = (P(T) x P(R|T))/P(R).
When we also have B, our background information, is suspect. You should be conditioning on all relevant information.
Steve Verdon | Oct 21, 2009 | Reply
Steve,
I have clearly laid out the key elements and no one has refuted Plantinga’s analysis. Read the books for yourself.
David Theroux | Oct 21, 2009 | Reply
David,
That is your interpretation. For example the new analysis that fails to condition on B makes this “correction” dubious. In other words, Plantinga should be working with,
P(N|R&B) = (P(N|B) x P(R|N&B))/P(R|B)
and
P(T|R&B) = (P(T|B) x P(R|T&B))/P(R|B).
Plantinga can still get rid of the denominators, but then he is stuck with arguing that P(R|N&B) is small or inscrutable which is not the same as arguing that P(R|N) is small or inscrutable. That is given naturalism and what we know about R, is there reason to think it is small, large, what?
Plantinga’s “solution” is to basically say, “I am purposfully not going to condition on all relevant information.”
Not much of a solution, most Bayesians would frown on that.
Steve Verdon | Oct 21, 2009 | Reply
Steve,
You continue to make your erroneous claims without having examined the material.
David Theroux | Oct 21, 2009 | Reply
David,
Thank you for the response and the rich and stimulating article.
Before I address the article, let me establish a background on myself. I may very well be a naturalist but I am not a dualist or a materialist, and certainly not a positivist or post-modernist. I believe the world is best understood as composed of patterns of interaction. Quarks, molecules, stars, rabbits, thoughts, “the self” and free will are all made up of increasingly complex patterns of interaction.
I believe that knowledge, value, life, culture and science emerge from a learning process or algorithm that is implicit in the natural world. The learning process is (with no claim of originality on my part) best represented as Variation, Selection, Propagation and Aggregation/Combination. Biological evolution is one such learning algorithm as is our immune system, our behavioral learning process, our cultural and economic system and the process of science itself (I am not a memeticists though). Complex adaptive systems persist by adapting and “solutions” are adaptations that resist entropy (the ultimate problem).
Enough background though...
The heart of the article is in the argument from reason as laid out on pages 105-108. The essence of my disagreement is with the assumption that reason/ explanations/ abstract propositions have no spacio-temporal properties and are thus by definition non-natural. I do not see it that way at all. An assumption/thought/belief is a specific event (I’m actually having one right now), though it can be abstracted or generalized to be atemporal or applicable to any time or place. A thought can be a specific, real event generalized to apply to any or all other times and places. That’s why we have thoughts (or at least my generalized assumption of why we have them).
If I understand you correctly, you also argue that the chance of an assumption being correct would be a “fluke” unless assumptions are influenced by other assumptions, and since assumptions are non spacio-temporal, we are again introducing dualism. Again, I disagree that generalized, abstract principles are in any sense less real than tables, emotions or the dialogue from Pulp Fiction.
Assumptions/explanations can and do interact, and via a learning process of introducing variation, selecting variations that work, propagating (retaining and repeating) these solutions and then aggregating and combining them, we can align our ideas better and better with causation. Good ideas are much more predictive. Your “truth” is my “extremely well aligned assumptions.” The difference is that yours seems to come down from a Platonic realm and mine emerges up from a learning process. By the way, I see both as coherent, though competing, world views.
Let me now go on and address two of your specific comments:
YOU WROTE: “Your view falls into the same contradictory, epistemological, subjectivist category as that of Montayne that somehow truth is simply “fitness.” Yet in making such (or any) claim, you are necessarily making an inference that a certain concept is correct and others are not, which of course the subjectivist is claiming is not possible. In other words, every time you make an assertion, you are claiming something to be true and others false. And to do so, you are comparing outcomes to some objective ground of what “correct” or “good” (as in your use of the term “good” science) means, and in this case “fitness.” For example, you note that the statement that “If I run from a tiger and explain it as a compelling desire to brush my teeth” is false, but on what basis? Clearly the statement is “fit” for the survival of the person involved and hence for you must be “true,” but what difference does such a brain state make? Yes, if other creatures have a different brain state that produces the same outcome, this affects the environment in which the brain state operates. But so what? If only the laws of physics are the determining factors, every unguided brain state is equivalent (and hence “true” as you define it) and “fitness” can equally mean death or life for the person since neither outcome is “true” or “good,” but instead simply is. The point here is that the concepts of “fitness” and “choice” are snuck in as objective concepts by evo-devo advocates in addition to the already recognized objectivity of the laws of physics in order to explain life forms and assess outcomes, while “fitness” and “choice” are not used for non-life forms such as rocks or crystals. In effect, the biological subjectivist must utilize a form of dualism in order to be coherent in assessing reality because reality, including the evo-devo advocate’s own claim, cannot be explained simply in terms of chance and the laws of physics.”
MY RESPONSE: Complex adaptive systems such as life only persist if they are indeed adaptive. And yes, I suppose that truth is a subset of adaptation in my view. True ideas solve problems better than false ones (though we can never be sure a more true idea doesn’t exist). Value, knowledge and meaning emerge with life — they are intimately woven into its very fabric. Rocks and crystals are not complex adaptive systems, but we are, and for us to remain as complex adaptive systems we need to solve problems. That is what value is to us — it is life, it is experience it is continuing to adapt. The only other option is nihilism and the absence of any value. Adaptive systems are valuing systems by definition and they bootstrap each other into existence through the learning algorithm inherent in nature.
YOU WROTE: In your discussion about the origins of humans having the capacity to make explanations, you also assume the answer as another “just-so story” by stating that “biology solved this problem long ago!” But my point is that biological determinism does not explain “explanations” or even the consciousness necessary to have minds and the free will and reason needed. Plantinga’s critique of naturalism is devastating here and there is simply no response possible because all assessments must first recognize a dualism that the mind is a precondition for science to exist and for you to make any rational inferences whatsoever. If you instead assume that humans are simply matter in motion, there is no point when the independent standing of reason and free will can enter the picture since for the evo-devo advocate all is always determined mechanically. And predictably, virtually all biological determinists incoherently deny the existence of free will:
MY RESPONSE: I believe my response to your article addresses that I do not assume we are just matter in motion and that I do believe inferences are real and can effect other inferences. As for free will, I believe that free will does exist and is the alignment between 1) our view of our selves, 2) our view of our action, and 3) our view of our desires. The confusion of the term comes partially because there are no objective black and white standards of what constitutes self from non-self (after all, we are patterns of interaction). I am not denying that self exists, but there can be many interpretations. When I open the refrigerator, my biological self wants to eat chocolate cake now, my social self wants to stay trim and healthy and eat carrots. If I choose to eat cake, I can view this act both as one of free will (I wanted it) and compunction (I couldn’t resist it). Free will is thus the alignment of our self view and our actions. Granted, this just moves the determinism issue back a step, but free will is about my ability to choose. In the end it is the universe that causes everything, but I am an essential part of that universe. Free will is one interpretation, and in many cases it is the best one. (I’ve noticed philosopher Raymond Smullyan making similar arguments). Certainly I am affected by all the “causal variables in the world.” I do not deny interaction any more than I want to live in a world where I could see through everything (and thus see nothing). We are intimately interwoven into the universe — as is our will and our rationality.
YOU WROTE: The result of such reductionism in the modern world has been to undermine and even deny and oppose the objective concepts of “values, free will, life, morality, ideas, the rule of law, and meaning” that you so admirably quote your support for.
MY RESPONSE: Yes, I concur, such post-modern reductionism is self defeating.
Sorry for the long post, and thank you for your insights, observations and constructive dialogue.
R D Parker | Oct 22, 2009 | Reply
Roger,
Thank you for your kind words, and I commend you for your interest in seeking to explain the obvious existence of free will as a reality and that such a truth is necessary for rational inference, morality, science, etc. However, your attempt fails because your analysis remains handicapped by naturalism, even if you are not a strict physicalist. Your theory of adaptation is just another version of “fitness” selection in which free will somehow emerges as an epiphenomenon in a world entirely ruled by the laws of physics. Where exactly does this “social self” and “choice” come from, not to mention your ability to theorize at all about them? In other words, as with all naturalists, you necessarily assume dualism in order to claim the opposite.
Again, Alvin Plantinga’s epistemological work is highly recommended as he assesses every version of naturalism and finds that they all utterly fail. And yes, post-modernist views are self-defeating, but so are modernist mechanistic views from which post-modernism is largely a reaction.
David Theroux | Oct 23, 2009 | Reply